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Forensic analysis of cloud artifacts is still in its infancy; current approaches overwhelming
follow the traditional method of collecting artifacts on a client device. In this work, we
introduce the concept of analyzing cloud-native digital artifactsedata objects that maintain
the persistent state of web/SaaS applications. Unlike traditional applications, in which the
persistent state takes the form of ﬁles in the local ﬁle system, web apps download the
necessary state on the ﬂy and leave no trace in local storage.
Using Google Docs as a case study, we demonstrate that such artifacts can have a
completely different structureetheir state is often maintained in the form of a complete
(or partial) log of user editing actions. Thus, the traditional approach of obtaining a
snapshot in time of the state of the artifacts is inherently forensically deﬁcient in that it
ignores potentially critical information on the evolution of a document over time. Further,
cloud-native artifacts have no standardized external representation, which raises ques-
tions with respect to their long-term preservation and interpretation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
articleunder theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The traditional business model of the software industry
has been software as a product (SaaP); that is, software is
acquired like any physical product and, once the sale is
complete, the owner can use it as they see for an unlimited
period of time. The alternativeesoftware as a service
(SaaS)eis a subscription-based model, which did not start
becoming practical until the emergence of widespead
Internet access some two decades ago. Conceptually, the
move from SaaP to SaaS shifts the responsibility for oper-
ating the software and its environment from the customer
to the provider. Technologically, such a shift was enabled by
the growth of the Internet as a universal means of com-
munications, and was facilitated by the emergence of the
web browser as a standardized client user interface (UI)
platform.), smcculle@my.uno.
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSThe traditional analytical model of digital forensics has
been client-centricethe investigator works with physical
evidence carriers, such as storage media or integrated
compute devices (e.g., smartphones). On the client (or
standalone) device it is easy to identify where the com-
putations are performed and where the results/traces are
stored. Therefore, research has focused on discovering and
acquiring every little piece of log and timestamp informa-
tion, and extracting every last bit of discarded data that
applications and the OS may have left behind.
The introduction of Gmail in 2004ethe ﬁrst web 2.0
application in widespread useedemonstrated that all the
essential technological prerequisites for mass, web-based
SaaS deployments have been met. The introduction of the
ﬁrst public cloud services by Amazon in 2006 enabled any
vendor to rent scalable, server-side infrastructure and
become a SaaS provider. A decade later, the transition to
SaaS is moving at full speed, and the need to understand it
forensically is becoming ever more critical.
This massive technological shift presents a qualitatively
new challenge for forensics; one that cannot be addressed
by minor adjustments to tools and practices. Speciﬁcally,. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Fig. 1. SaaS application architecture.
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worldeboth code and data are delivered over the
network on demand, and thus become moving forensic
targets. For example, a Google Docs document shows up as
nothing more than a hyperlink on the local disk; the actual
content is downloaded and made available for editing only
in the browser.
In this work, we approach the problem by going directly
to the data sourceethe service providereusing both public
and private APIs and data structures. This leads to a new
approach that, we believe, is a preview of how cloud
forensic tools will be built.
Related work
The primary focus of previous work on cloud storage
forensics has been on adapting the traditional application
forensics approach to ﬁnding client-side artifacts. This in-
volves blackbox differential analysis, where before and
after images are created and compared to deduce the
essential functions of the application. Section (Client-based
data acquisition & analysis) summarizes representative
work in this area.
Section (API-baseddataacquisition&analysis) presents a
more recent alternative,which seeks to avoid the limitations
of client acquisition by working with the provider's API.
Client-based data acquisition & analysis
Chung et al. (2012) analyzed four cloud storage services
(Amazon S3, Google Docs, Dropbox, and Evernote) in search
of traces left by them on the client system that can be used
in criminal cases. They reported that the analyzed services
may create different artifacts depending on speciﬁc fea-
tures of the services, and proposed a process model for
forensic investigation of cloud storage services based on
the collection and analysis of artifacts of the target cloud
storage services from client systems. The procedure in-
cludes gathering volatile data from aMac/Windows system
(if available), and then retrieving data from the Internet
history, log ﬁles, and directories. On mobile devices they
rooted an Android phone to gather data and for iPhone they
used iTunes information like backup iTunes ﬁles. The
objective was to check for traces of a cloud storage service
exist in the collected data.
In Hale (2013), Hale analyzes the Amazon Cloud Drive
and discusses the digital artifacts left behind after an
Amazon Cloud Drive account has been accessed or
manipulated from a computer. There are two possibilities
to manipulate an Amazon Cloud Drive Account: one is via
theweb application accessible using aweb browser and the
other is a client application provided by Amazon and can be
installed on the system. After analyzing the two methods,
he found artifacts of the interface in the web browser his-
tory, and among cached ﬁles. He also found application
artifacts in the Windows registry, application installation
ﬁles on default location, and an SQLite database used to
keep track of pending upload/download tasks.
Quick and Choo (2013) analyzedDropbox and discuss the
artifacts left behind after a Dropbox account has been
accessed, or manipulated. Using hash analysis and keywordsearches they try to determine if the client software pro-
videdbyDropboxhas beenused. This involves extracting the
account username from browser history (Mozilla Firefox,
Google Chrome, and Microsoft Internet Explorer), and the
use of the Dropbox through several avenues such as direc-
tory listings, prefetch ﬁles, link ﬁles, thumbnails, registry,
browser history, and memory captures. In follow-up work,
Quick and Choo (2014) use a similar conceptual approach to
analyze the client-side operation and artifacts of Google
Drive, and provide a starting point for investigators.
Martini and Choo (2013) have researched the operation
of ownCloud, which is a self-hosted ﬁle synchronization and
sharing solution. As such, it occupies a slightly different
niche as it is much more likely for the client and server
sides to be under the control of the same person/organi-
zation. They were able to recover artifacts including sync
and ﬁle management metadata (logging, database and
conﬁguration data), cached ﬁles describing the ﬁles the
user has stored on the client device and uploaded to the
cloud environment or vise versa, and browser artifacts.API-based data acquisition & analysis
The client-side acquisition approaches discussed so far
have one big assumption in common; namely, that all the
data artifacts of interest can be acquired from the client.
The problem is that this is not true in the general case, and
is likely to be not true in the common case. As illustrated on
Fig. 1, the client can no longer be considered the original
source of the data. Rather, it maintains a cached version that
is likely incomplete (inmoreways than one) and potentially
out of date.
Considering the above functional architecture, there are
three major lapses in client-based acquisitions of cloud-
hosted data:
Partial replication. The most obvious problem is that
none of the clients working with a cloud storage account
may have a complete copy of the data. Currently, cloud
storage providers offer selective replication so that devices
with less local storage (smartphones) are not over-
whelmed. Going forward, as data accumulates online, it
would become increasingly impractical (and unnecessary)
to maintain a complete local copy. Amazon already offers
unlimited storage at $60/year, and that is a lot of data to
clone locally. From a forensic standpoint, a client-based
acquisition is blind to the overall picture, and has no
means to guarantee completeness.
Artifact revisions. Most storage services provide auto-
matic revision tracking that keeps copies of previous
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client cache, and are only recalled on demand (via a web
interface). Forensically, this is another dimension along
which a client-based acquisition is blind and incomplete.
Cloud-native artifacts. Web applications rarely store
persistent state on the client devices. There are some
notable exceptions, such as the caching of user credentials
and ofﬂine operation while disconnected, but the norm is
that all data is hosted on the server side. This gives rise to
the concept of cloud-native data, which we use to describe
internal data structures used by SaaS applications that are
not stored on the client persistently. This clearly creates a
problem for client-side methods as the data of forensic
interest is not present locally.
In Roussev et al. (2016), we argued that the only way to
fully address the ﬁrst two aspects of the problem is to
utilize the service provider's ofﬁcial API. We developed a
cloud drive acquisition tool, kumodd, which can perform
full API-based acquisition of four major cloud providers:
Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, andMicrosoft OneDrive. Our tool
can enumerate and download all ﬁles associated with one
of the above accounts and all of their revisions. Further, it
can acquire snapshots of cloud-native artifacts in standard
formats, such as PDF, via the API.
However, kumodd cannot possibly acquire cloud-native
artifacts in their original form because they are not part of
the ofﬁcial API supported. For example, a Google Docs
document is represented as a hyperlink and there are no
means in the API to acquire the content. From a developer's
point of view, such artifacts are internal data structures and
there is no necessity to provide access to them via the API.
In effect, there is a private communication protocol be-
tween the client and server components of the web app
that is used alongside the public one (Fig. 1).
The remainder of this discussion focuses on the acqui-
sition and analysis of cloud-native artifacts, using Google
Docs as a case study.
Understanding Google Docs
For the purposes of this discussion, we use Google Docs
to refer to the entire suite of online ofﬁce, productivity andFig. 2. DraftBack analytical intcollaboration tools offered by Google. We use Documents,
Sheets, Slides, etc., to refer to the individual applications in
that suite.
In all likelihood, the very ﬁrst cloud-native tool with
forensics applications is DraftBack (draftback.com): a
browser extension created by the writer and programmer
James Somers, which can replay the complete history of a
Documents document. The primary intent of the code is to
give writers the ability to look over their own shoulder and
analyze how they write. Coincidentally, this is precisely
what a forensic investigator would like to be able to
doerewind to any point in the life of a document, right to
the very beginning.
In addition to providing the in-browser playback (using
the Quill open source editor (Chen and Mulligan) of all the
plaintext editing actionseeither in fast-forward, or real-
time modeeDraftBack provides an analytical interface
which maps the time of editing sessions to locations in the
document (Fig. 2).
This can be used to narrow down the scope of inquiry
for long-lived documents. Somers' work, although not
motivated by forensics, is an example of SaaS analysis that
does not rely on trace data resident on the clienteall results
are produced solely by (partially) reverse engineering the
web application's private protocol. Assuming that an
investigator is in possession of valid user credentials, or
such are provided by Google under legal order, the exam-
ination can be performed on the spot; any spot with a
browser and an Internet connection.
These observation served as a starting point of our own
work in an effort to build a true forensic tool that un-
derstands the needs of the investigative process.
Documents
In 2010, Google unveiled a new version of Google Docs
(Google, 2010a), allowing for greater real-time online
collaboration. The new Documents editor, named kix, han-
dles rendering elements like a traditional word process-
orea clear break from prior practices where an editable
HTML element was used. Kix was “designed speciﬁcally for
character-by-character real time collaboration usingerface (edited for size).
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transformation is a concurrency management mechanism
that eschewes preventive locking in favor of reactive, on-
the-ﬂy resolution of conﬂicting user actions by trans-
forming the editing operation to achieve consistency.)
Another important technical decision was to keep a
detailed history of document revisions that allows users to
go back to any previous version; this feature is available to
any collaborator with editing privileges.
Google's approach to storing the revisions is also
different than most prior solutionserather than keep a
series of snapshots, the complete history of editing
actionsesince the creation of the documenteis retained.
When a speciﬁc version is needed, the log is replayed from
the beginning until the desired time; replaying the entire
log yields the current version. This design means that, in
effect, there is no delete operation that irrevocably destroys
data, and that has important forensic (and privacy)
implications.
To support ﬁne-grain revisions, as well as collaborative
editing, user actions are pushed to the server as often as
every 150 ms, depending on the speed of input. In collab-
oration mode, these ﬁne-grained actions, primarily in-
sertions and deletions of text and images, are merged on
the server end, and a uniﬁed history of the document is
recorded. The actions, potentially transformed, are then
pushed to the other clients to ensure consistent, up-to-date
views of the document.
The number of major revisions available via the public
API corresponds to the major revisions shown to user.
Major style changes seem to prompt more of those types of
revisions; for example, our working document where we
keep track of our experiments has over 5100 incremental
revisions but only six major one. However, the test docu-
ment we used for reverse engineering purposes, has 27
major revisions with less than 1000 incremental ones. It
appears the passage of time since last edit also plays a role.
Starting a new session does not seem to be enough to
trigger a new major revision.Fig. 3. Chunked snapshot for a document containThe internal representation of the document, as deliv-
ered to the client, is in the form of a JSON object called
changelog. The structure is deeply nested but contains one
array per revision, with most elements of the array con-
taining objects (keyevalue pairs). Each array ends with
identifying information for that revision as follows: an
epoch timestamp in Unix format, the Google ID of the
author, revision number, session ID, session revision
number, and the revision itself.
Each time the document is opened, a new session is
generated, and the number of revisions that occur within
that session are tracked. Some revisions, such as inserting
an object, appear as a single entry with multiple actions in
the form of a multiset, which contains a series of nested
dictionaries. The keys in the dictionary are abbreviated
(2e4 characters)ealmost certainly for performance rea-
sonsebut not outright obfuscated.
The changelog contains a special chunked snapshot ob-
ject, which contains all the information needed to create
the document as of the starting revision. The length of the
snapshot varies greatly depending on the number of
embedded kix objects and paragraphs; it has only two en-
tries (containing default text styles) for revisions starting
at 1.
For any revision with text in the document, the ﬁrst
element of the snapshot consists of a plaintext string of all
text in the document, followed by default styles for title,
subtitle, and headings h1 through h6, language of the
document, and ﬁrst paragraph index and paragraph styles.
The next several elements are all kix anchors for embedded
objects like comments or suggestions, followed by a listing
of each contiguous format area with the styles for those
sections that should be applied, as well as paragraphs and
associated IDs used to jump to those sections from a table
of contents.
Fig. 3 shows the representation of a minimal example
document; one inwhich the text “Test document” has been
typed. In this case, the snapshot (starting on line 3) con-
tains the state of the document before the very last upda-ing the text “Test document” (shortened).
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snapshot contains a text insertion for the string “Test
docum” (line 4, highlighted), as well as a number of default
style deﬁnitions and other basic document properties. The
log part of the document contains a single insertion of the
string “ent” (line 2, highlighted) with the appropriate time
stamp and identifying information.
More generally, document description from revision x to
revision y, therewould be a snapshot of the state at revision
x, followed by y x entries in the changelog describing
each individual change between revisions x and y. The
ability to choose the range of changes to load, allows kix to
balance the ﬂexibility of allowing users to go back in time,
and the need to be efﬁcient and not replay needlessly
ancient document history.
The changelog for a speciﬁc range of versions can be
obtained manually by using the development tools built
into modern browsers. After logging in and opening the
document, the list of network requests contains a load URL
of the form: https://docs.google.com/documents/d/<doc_
id>/load?<doc_id>&start¼<start_rev>&end¼<end_
rev>&token¼<auth_token>, where doc_id is the unique
document identiﬁer, start_rev is the initial revision (snap-
shot), end_rev the end of the revision range, and auth_token
is an authentication token (Fig. 4). The revisions start at one
and must not exceed the actual number of revisions, and
the start cannot be greater than the end.
To retrieve the document from the command line, we
can compose request using the URL in the address bar and
the necessary authentication headers (Google Chrome
provides a convenient “copy as cURL” option that con-
structs the full command line automatically). Alternatively,
the URL could be opened in a browser window.
To facilitate automated collection, we built a Python tool,
called kumodocs, which uses the Google Drive API to ac-
quire the changelog for a given range of versions. It also
parses the JSON result and converts it into a ﬂat CSV format
to simplify its automated processing with existing tools.
Each line contains a timestamp, user id, revision number,
session id, session revision, action type, followed by aFig. 4. Example load request adictionary of key-value pairs involved in any modiﬁcations.
This format is closer to that of traditional logs and is easier
to both examine the editing events manually, and to use
command-line text processing tools. The style modiﬁcation
are encoded in dictionaries so that they can be readily used
(in Python, or JavaScript) to replay the events in a different
editor.
The ﬁrst stage in this process is to obtain the plaintext
content of the documents, followed by the application of
the decoded formating styles, and the addition of
embedded objects (like images). Once the changelog is
acquired, obtaining the plaintext is relatively easy by
applying all string insert and delete operations, and
ignoring everything else.
Actions manipulating page elements, such as a table,
equation, picture, etc., have a type of ae (add element), de
(delete element), or te (tether element); the latter is
associated with a kix anchor and kix id. Element in-
sertions are accompanied by a multiset of style adjust-
ments, containing large dictionaries of initialization
values. Objects like comments and suggestions only
contain anchor and id information in the changelog, and
no actual text content.
Picture element insertions contain source location
(URL), with uploaded ﬁles containing a local URL accessible
through HTML5's FileSystem API (ﬁlesystem: https://docs.
google.com/persistent/docs/documents/<doc_id>/image/
<image_id>). Inserting an image from Google Drive pro-
duces a source URL in the changelog from the
googleusercontent.com domain (Google's CDN). Upon
further examination of the HTML elements in the revision
document, we established that they were referencing a
different CDN link, even immediately after insertion. As
expected, images inserted from URLs also had a copy in the
CDN given that the source might not be available after
insertion.
By analyzing the network requests, we found that the
(internal) Documents API has a renderdata method. It is
used with a POST request with the same headers and query
strings as the load method used to fetch the changelog:nd changelog response.
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The renderdata request body contains, in effect, a bulk
data request in the form:The cosmoId values observed correspond to the i_cid
attribute of embedded pictures in the changelog, and the
container is the document id. The renderdata response
contains a list of the CDN-hosted URLs that are world
readable.
To understand the behavior of CDN-stored images, we
embedded two freshly taken photos (never published on
the Internet) into a new document; one of the images was
embedded directly from the local ﬁle system, the other one
via Google Drive. After deleting both images in the docu-
ment, the CDN-hosted links continued to be available
(without authentication); this was tested via a script which
downloads the images every hour and those remained
available for the duration of the test (72 h).
In a related experiment, we embedded two different
pictures in a similar way to a new sheet. Then, we deleted
the entire document from Google Drive; the picture links
remained live for approximately another hour before dis-
appearing. Taken together, the experiments suggests that
an embedded image remains available from the CDN, as
long as at least one revision of a document references it;
once all references are deleted, the object is garbage
collected. Forensically, this is an interesting behavior that
can potentially uncover very old data, long considered
destroyed by its owners.
From a security perspective, the CDN design is not
unreasonableeit has the security model of a dead
dropeanyone who knows the location can access it. Given
the length of the identiﬁer and its apparent randomness, it
would be infeasible to guess it. From the point of view of
application design, it is effectively necessary to maintain
CDN objects that could potentially be needed to restore a
previous version of a document. However, the behavior is
not necessarily intuitive to users, and can bring back to life
artifacts long considered erased.Fig. 5. Slides changelog exReverting to a previous version is another operation that
does not destroy the editing history of the document;
instead, a revert operations containing a snapshot of the
desired new state is added to the history. In other words,the reversion operation itself can be later walked back and
the state before it can be examined, consistent with the
append-only design chosen by Google.
Access to embedded Google Drawings objects is a
different fromembedded imagesethe changelog references
them by a unique drawing id. The drawing could then
be accessed by https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/
<drawing_id>/image?w¼<width>&h¼<height>. This URL
does require Google authentication and the authenticated
used must have appropriate access permissions.Slides and drawings
We found that the Slides app uses a similar changelog
approach to transfer the state of the artifacts. That is, the
data is communicated as an abstract data structure, which
is interpreted and rendered by the JavaScript client code.
The overall formatting of the log was similar, with the most
important difference being that it was sent as an array of
arrays and values instead of a dictionary and values as the
Documents were (Fig. 5). It appears that all of the keys had
been removed from the dictionaries and only the values
sent instead, in effect, as a tuple. This makes the reverse
engineering a bit more cumbersome, but it still allows us to
track the mapping between chosen actions and their
encoding, as before.
The ﬁrst element in each update contains an integer
encoding of the type ﬁeld, with 15 corresponding to string
insertion, 16 to text deletion, 3 to text box creation, and so
on (the Appendix provides a summary of our ﬁndings). The
multiset operation in the description of more complex
events, such the creation of a new slide, with operations
detailing the type of slide inserted, followed by several
insert actions for each text box for that slide.ample (truncated).
Fig. 6. Drawings changelog/snapshot example.
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the title id is i0 and subtitle id is i1. Every other text box
has a unique id such as g675a3a03f_0_2, with the ﬁnal
element being incremented whenever a new text box is
created with that id. The ﬁrst number appears to be a
version/session identiﬁereclosing the slide and reopen-
ing the web page causes it to increase by 1; the 10-digit
preﬁx also changes occasionally but we have not yet
established the exact circumstances. Text box de-
scriptions have a six-element list describing the starting
x; y position in the page, orientation, and scalar size
associated with it. The granularity of changes for Slides is
higher than in Documents, as each character has its
own revision, rather than occasionally being grouped
together with others. Each insertion details the id of the
text box and the index to be inserted in that text box, and
deletion is similar in that a text box id and range are
given.
Adding a slide consists of a group of operations (a
transaction) containing the creation of a slide, setting of
slide attributes, insertion of text boxes (based on the tem-
plate). Duplicating a slide is a large transaction, consisting
of the creation of the same slide type, andefor each text
box on old slideethe addition of a box, as well as the
respective text and style. Deletion is another transaction,
where each box is deleted from the slide ﬁrst, followed by
the slide itself. Changing the theme of a slide creates a
massive number of actions inside a transaction with an
entirely new slide being created, and each text box is
created and has 30e40 modiﬁcation actions associated
with it, followed by the old slide having all of its text boxes
deleted and, ﬁnally, the old slide itself deleted.
As shown on Fig. 6, the structure of drawing objects'
changelog is a simpliﬁed version of the Slides changelog.
Unlike Fig. 5, this one shows the complete artifact for a
drawing consisting of a single text box with the word
“Test”.Fig. 7. Suggestion changelogSheets
We applied the same differential analysis approach to
the Sheets app as before, and monitored the network in-
teractions with the server to understand the protocol. It
appears that Sheets, which also supports incremental ver-
sioning after every update, works differently. When a
request for a speciﬁc version is performed, the response is a
browser-ready HTML document. In other words, both the
computations and the HTML encoding are performed on
the server, and the ﬁnal result is spoonfed to the browser
for rendering; no dynamic adjustments necessary. It is still
feasible to extract the state of the spreadsheet after every
update; however, critical informationesuch as formulaseis
not available.
The solution to this problem is to use the Google Sheets
API, which provides the means to extract the content of
individual cells, including formulas. Such an effort is
beyond the scope of this discussion, in part, due to the very
different communication protocol adopted in Sheets. The
results of the API calls to retrieve cell ranges are encoded in
XML using the Atom Syndication Format (RFC 4287, 5988)
and will require more complex parsing than the light-
weight JSON used in Documents and Slides.
Suggestions and comments
Suggestions are marked up edits to the document that
can be accepted, or rejected, by the collaborators; this
similar to the “track changes”mode inMicrosoft Word. They
are present in the changelog and are treated similarly to
other changes; however, they have dedicated operation
types that allow the editor to treat them differently in
terms of formatting and UI (Fig. 7).
Comments are not explicitly represented in the
changelog; instead, a kix anchor id is present (Fig. 8).
Fortunately, the Google Drive API has a list method, whichexample (truncated).
Fig. 8. Comment changelog example (truncated).
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document, including deleted ones. However, the actual
content of deleted comments is stripped away; only current
and resolved ones are available.
Thus, both comments and suggestions are part of the
long-term history of a document and are readily recover-
able either via the public, or the private service interface.
PoC tool: kumodocs
At present, our proof of concept tool, kumodocs, works
on Documents and Slides artifacts. Given a range of revisions
(corresponding to a time interval), the tool will acquire and
interpret the changelog and will produce a plaintext
version of the document as of the last speciﬁed revision.
Kumodocs will also acquire all embedded images that were
active for at least part of the period.
For Slides, we map all text edits from the changelog to
the individual text boxes, and output the result in a series of
ﬁles: slide0_box0.txt, slide0_box1.txt, slide1_box0.txt, etc.
(empty ones are skipped). We also acquire all suggestions
and comments associated with the document as appro-
priately named text ﬁle.
Summary
Our experience with analyzing the three Google Docs
applications validates our motivating concerns. Namely, we
saw thateeven within the same suite of toolsethe ap-
proaches to maintaining and rendering the internal state of
the artifacts vary in a non-trivial fashion. Based on the
observed differences, it is almost certain that these three
products have been developed by different teams, and each
product bears the stamp of its designers.
Documents is closest to how most web application are
developededata is communicated in abstract form in
structured JSON and rendered on the client. Slides's proto-
col is clearly not designed to be human-readableeit ap-
pears that its design is dominated by efﬁciency concerns.
The numeric encoding of operations and ﬂat data structure
(the use of JSON is nominal) makes it faster to interpret on
the client. Like Documents, the data is communicated in
pure form and all rendering is performed by the client.
Sheets takes an entirely server-centric approacheall calcu-
lations and all rendering work is done on the server.
In the absence of any standardized external repre-
sentationsesuch as the ones used by standalone client
applicationsethere is a deﬁnite need to develop tools and(most likely) new formats that allow the acquisition, and
long-term preservation and interpretation of cloud-native
artifacts. Similar to draftback, our prototype has the abil-
ity to perform a basic playback of text editing using the
Quill open source editor.Discussion
Based on our analysis, there are several interesting im-
plications for the forensic examination of Google Docs
artifacts.
Online preview. One unexpected results is that it is not
unsound for an investigator to review a document in edit-
ing mode (in order to have access to all revisions since
creation). Since the history of the document is an append-
only log, it is practically impossible for any user to spoil the
document, as any modiﬁcations can easily be undone.
However, whole document deletion is still a problem so we
need a “write blocker” app/browser extension that moni-
tors HTTP requests and ﬁlters out requests that can spoil
the evidence.
The golden hour. It appears that Google's CDN, which
hosts embedded objects (images), keeps them around for
about an hour after deletion. This opens up the opportunity
to potentially recover from last-minute deletions, by
combining methods from browser and memory forensics
and the retrieval of remnant CDN objects.
Reverse engineering is still critical. Our experience
shows that reverse engineering is still needed in the cloud
forensics environment, although the emphasis will likely
shift to network protocols. While prior work (Roussev
et al., 2016) showed that the public API is a valuable
source of evidence, this experience has brought back into
focus the need to understand how SaaS applications work
by means of reverse engineering their private protocol
and data structures. Fortunately, this is graybox (and not
blackbox) analysis as we can monitor all communications
and can instrument the client (JavaScript) code at critical
junctures.
Long-term preservation is a challenge. One conceptual
challenge is the problem of both storing the acquired evi-
dence, and retaining the ability to correctly interpret it.
Internal data, like the changelog, is an irreplaceable source
of evidence; however, it needs to be interpreted/rendered
in order to have meaning to the analyst. Unlike traditional
standalone applications, we do not have the ability to retain
the application's code (which is split between the client
and the server); thus, any solution would involve some
Table 1
Documents changelog keys.
Key/key: value Interpretation
Operations
mlti multi-operation (transaction)
is, ds insert/delete string
ae, de, ue, te embedded elements: add, delete, update,
tether (to anchor)
rvrt revert to earlier revision
op operational transformation
sdef_ps, sdef_ts set default paragraph/text style
as, sm adjust/modify
msfd, usfd, sas suggestion added/rejected/accepted
sugid suggestion id
Operation attributes
mts multi-operation description
s string argument
si, ei starting/ending index
ibi insert before index
tbs_al, tbs_of table alignment/offset
das_a datasheet anchor
Document style &
attributes
ds_pw, ds_ph page width/height
ds_mt, ds_mb top/bottom margin
ds_ml, ds_mr left/right margin
lgs_l language
Header styles
hs_t, hs_st, hs_nt title, subtitle, normal text
hs_h1 … hs_h6 h1/ldots/h6
Paragraph style
ps_hdid, ps_hd heading id/style
ps_al, ps_ls horizontal alignment line space
ps_il, ps_iﬂ indent line/ﬁrst line (amount)
ps_sb, ps_sa space before/after paragraph (amount)
Text style
ts_ff, ts_fs font family/size
ts_fgc, ts_bgc foreground/background color
ts_bd, ts_it bold/italic
ts_un, ts_st underline/strikethrough
ts_sc, ts_va small caps, vertical alignment
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the lowest-hanging fruitereplaying plaintext editing
commands, and acquiring embedded images. A more
complete solution would be to translate the log into com-
mands for a comparable application, where all formatting
can be faithfully reproduced so that the visual appearance
is retained.
How representative is Google Docs? It is important for
follow-up work to understand to what degree the design of
Google Docs is representative of a broader class of online
collaborative application suites in general. We have done
some preliminary studies on several similar tools, such as
Zoho Writer, Microsoft Word Online, and Dropbox Paper. The
initial impression is that, as per the real-time requirements
of such apps, incremental updates are continuously sent to
the server, and that ﬁne-grain versions of the document are
made available to the user (and the investigator). Unlike
Google Docs, we did not readily identify an internal API
mechanism by which the log of editing action could be
retrieved. However, there are indications that the log itself
likely exists on the server and that the versions shown to
the user are generated from it on the ﬂy. There are also
signs that the append-only log is an idea that appeals to
developers; e.g., reverting to an older version in ZohoWriter
causes is to be added to the list of user-selectable versions
(tagged with “reverted”); Word and Paper have similar
concepts.
Conclusion
In this work, we performed an initial examination of
Google Docs artifacts in an effort to understand the chal-
lenges and opportunities presented by cloud-native arti-
facts. We deﬁne such artifacts as data objects used by web/
SaaS applications that are hosted exclusively in the cloud
infrastructure, and are not stored persistently by client
devices. The speciﬁc contributions to the ﬁeld are as
follows:
Problem formulation. We argued that the traditional
approach of client-side evidence acquisition is completely
blind to cloud-native artifacts. Further, the artifacts of
greatest importance are internal data structures that
contain important historical information are internal data
structures. Therefore, we need to develop forensic tools
that can acquire and interpret them. Further, we need to
develop the means to independently render the history of
an artifact for archival purposes.
Artifacts & behavior analysis. We performed an analysis
of Google Docs artifacts, with a primary emphasis on the
Documents and Slides applications and their changelog in-
ternal data structure. We greatly expanded upon Sommers
initial analysis (Somers) and systematically documented
our ﬁnding (Appendix: Changelog keys). Further, we
investigated the mechanisms used for embedding objects
into the artifacts and showed that Google's CDN is a
potentially vast source of recoverable data, with apparently
unlimited timeframe.
PoC tool development. The main practical result of this
work is the development of a set of proof-of-concept
tool that extracts and processes the history of Docu-
ments and Slides. Currently, we can extract the textcontent for any ﬁne-grain revision, the embedded images
and drawings, as well as the history of comments asso-
ciated with the document. The tool is called kumodocs,
and is available on GitHub at https://github.com/kumofx/
kumodocs.
In addition to forensics, the tool can also be used to
perform a quick privacy audit as it will identify all images,
suggestions, comments that have been ostensibly deleted,
but are still recoverable.
In the immediate future, we expect to complete the
analysis of the remaining apps in the Google Docs suite,
and to release a more complete speciﬁcation document
similar to (Metz, 2012). Following that, we expect to build
a complete solution that allows for the screening, acqui-
sition, and long-term preservation of Google Docs
evidence.
Appendix. Changelog keys
This appendix contains an (incomplete) set of operation
and attribute encodings used in the two versions of the
changelog. Its purpose is illustrative; a complete descrip-
tion will be the subject of a separate speciﬁcation
document.
Table 2
Slides changelog codes.
Code Interpretation
Operations
0 delete box
3 add box
4 multiset
5 modify box
6 adjust page element
9 adjust page style
12 add slide
13 delete slide
14 move slide
15 add text
16 delete text
17 adjust text style
18 set slide attributes
22 insert table
43 transition
44 insert image
Style modiﬁcations
½0;1 bold ﬂag
½1;1 italics ﬂag
½2;1 underline
½4;hexvalue color
½5; fontfamily font family
½6; fontsize font size (6..400)
½7; fontmod super/subscript font
(1 ¼ super, 2 ¼ sub)
½11; spacing line spacing (100/115/150/200)
½12;halign horizontal alignment
(1 ¼ left (default), 2 ¼ center, 3 ¼ right,
4 ¼ justiﬁed)
½20;1 strikethrough ﬂag
½44; valign vertical alignment (0 ¼ top, 1 ¼
middle, 2 ¼ bottom)
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